Abstract: Hash functions are used in many cryptographic constructions under various assumptions, and the practical impact of collision attacks is often unclear. In this paper, we show how collisions can be used to recover part of the password used in the APOP authentication protocol.
Other applications of Wang collisions have been proposed to attack HMAC with several hash functions in [3, 10] . The techniques use Wang's differential path as a black box but with particular messages to recover some keys in the related-key model or to construct advanced distinguishers.
Our Results
In the paper we try to extend Wang's attack to break more hash function uses. More precisely, we address the question of message freedom inside the colliding blocks, and we show that this can be used to attack APOP, a challenge-response authentication protocol.
The main contribution is a partial password-recovery attack against the APOP authentication protocol. We are able to recover 3 characters of the password, therefore greatly reducing its entropy. Even though we do not achieve the full recovery of the password, we reduce the complexity of the exhaustive search and it is sufficient in practice to reduce this search to a reasonable time for small passwords, i.e. less than 9 characters.
This attack needs some message freedom in MD5 collisions; our second contribution is a technique to gain partial control over the colliding blocks. We show that we can select some part at the end of the messages which will collide. Our attack can use any differential path, and only requires a set a sufficient conditions. We are able to choose the last three message words in a one-block MD4 collision, and three specific message words in a two-block MD5 collision with almost no overhead. We are also able to choose the 11 last words of a one-block MD4 collision with a work factor of about 2 31 MD4 computations.
An important point is that the technique used is nearly as efficient as the best message modifications on MD4 or MD5, even when we choose some parts of the messages. This contradicts the usual assumption that Wang's collisions are mostly random. As a first application of this new message modification technique, we show that a countermeasure recently proposed by Szydlo and Yin at CT-RSA '06 in [24] is almost useless for MD4 and can be partially broken for MD5. This can also be used to handle the padding inside the colliding blocks.
Related Work
The first MD4 collision was found by Dobbertin [8] , and his attack has a time complexity of about 2 20 MD4; it combines algebraic techniques and optimization techniques such as genetic algorithms. His attack also allows to choose a large part of the colliding blocks at some extra cost: one can choose 11 words out of 16 with a complexity of about 2 30 MD4 computations (little details are given and only an experimental time complexity).
Our work is based on Wang's collision attack [26, 28] , which have the following advantages over Dobbertin's:
• it can be adapted to other hash functions (Dobbertin's method can give collisions on the MD5 compression function, but has not been able to provide MD5 collisions);
• it is somewhat more efficient.
More recently, Yu et al. [31] proposed a differential path for MD4 collisions with a small number of sufficient conditions. This allows to build a collision (M, M ) which is close to a given messageM (about 44 different bits). This is quite different from what we are trying to do since the changed bits will be spread all over the message. We are trying to choose many consecutive bits, which is useful for different applications. However we studied their work and propose some improvements in Appendix A.
De Cannière and Rechberger announced at the rump session of CRYPTO '06 that they can find reduced-SHA-1 collisions and chose up to 25% of the message. However, they gave few details on their technique, and the conference version does not talk about this aspect of their work. Their idea seems to be to compute a differential path with the chosen message as conditions.
Organization of the Paper
This paper is divided in three sections: in the first part we describe APOP, how the attack works, and give background on MD4, MD5 and Wang's attack; then we describe our new collision finding algorithm and how to choose a part of the message; and eventually we describe some applications of these results, including the practical attack against APOP.
Background and Notation

POP3 and APOP
The Post Office Protocol Version 3 (POP3) is a standard protocol for remote mailbox access, defined by RFC 1081 in 1988 (current version is RFC 1939 [14] ). It is one of most prevalent protocol to for e-mail retrieval, together with the Internet Message Access Protocol Version 4 (IMAP4), first described in 1994 by RFC 1730 (current version is RFC 3051). Virtually all modern e-mail client support both protocols, as well as most email server. IMAP is usually recommended because it require less resources thanks to its online state, but according to different statistics gathered through the web, between 10% and 50% of users are using POP3: this is still a very widely used protocol.
Initially, POP3 only supported plaintext password through the USER and PASS commands; APOP was added in 1993 to provide a simple challenge-response authentication, and avoid passive eavesdropping attacks. The AUTH command was added later and allows to use any IMAP authentication mechanism (Kerberos, GSS-API, S/Key, CRAM-MD5, ...), and POP3 now support optional SSL encryption which protects the whole session.
Servers implementing the APOP command send a challenge (formatted as a message identifier, or msg-id) in their greeting message, and the client authenticates itself by sending the username, and the MD5 of the challenge concatenated with the password: MD5(msg-id||passwd). The server performs the same computation on his side, and checks if the digests match. Thanks to this trick, an eavesdropper will not learn the password, provided MD5 is a partial one-way function. In this example, the password is 'penguin'; hence the digest is MD5('<171.11776027@pop.mail.com>penguin'). The RFC request that challenge is a message identifier, and that is different for each connection; for instance, it can be generated as a timestamp.
H(M) = H(M
APOP Security
Since there is no integrity protection and no authentication of the server, this protocol is subject to a man-in-the-middle attack, but the man-in-the-middle should not be able to learn the password or to re-authenticate later. Quoting RFC 1939 [14] :
It is conjectured that use of the APOP command provides origin identification and replay protection for a POP3 session.
This challenge-response can be seen as a MAC algorithm, known as the suffix method: MAC k (M) = MD5(M||k). This construction is weak for at least two reasons: first, it allows offline collision search so there is a generic forgery attack with 2 n/2 computations and one chosen-text MAC; second, the keyrecovery attack against the envelope method of Preneel and van Oorschot [17] can be used on the suffix method with 2 67 offline computations and 2 13 chosen text MACs. This is a hint that APOP is weak, but these attacks require more computations than the birthday paradox, and the first one is mostly useless in a challenge-response protocol. However, we can combine these weaknesses with the collision attack against MD5 to build a practical attack against APOP.
The APOP Attack
In this attack, we will act as the server, and we will send some specially crafted challenges to the client. We will use pairs of challenges, such that the corresponding digest will collide only if some part of the password was correctly guessed.
Let us assume we can generate a MD5 collision with some specific format: As we can see in Figure 1 , if p 0 = 'x', the two hashes will collide after the second block, and since the end of the password and the padding are the same, we will see this collision in the full hashes (and it is very unlikely that the two hashes collide for p 0 = 'x'). Therefore we are able to test the first password character without knowing the others. We will construct pairs of challenge to test the 256 possible values, and stop once we have found the first password character.
Then we generate a new collision pair to recover the second character of the password: M = "<? This motivates the need for message freedom in MD5 collisions: we need to generate collisions with a specific format, and some chosen characters. We will see in section 4.3 that this attack can be used in practice to recover the first 3 characters of the password. We believe most passwords in real use are short enough to be found by exhaustive search once we know these first characters, and this attack will allow us to re-authenticate later. We stress that this attack is practical: it needs less than one hour of computation, and a few hundreds authentications.
Since people often read their mail from different places (including insecure wireless networks and Internet cafés), we believe that this man-in-the-middle setting is rather realistic for an attack against APOP. Moreover most mail clients automatically check the mailbox on a regular basis, so it seems reasonable to ask for a few hundred authentications.
MD4 and MD5
MD4 and MD5 follow the Merkle-Damgård construction. Their compression functions are designed to be very efficient, using 32-bit words and operations implemented in hardware in most processors:
• rotation ≪;
• addition mod 2 32 ;
• bitwise boolean functions Φ i .
The message block M is first split into 16 words M i 15 i=0 , then expanded to provide one word m i for each step of the compression function. In MD4 and MD5 this message expansion is simple, it just reuses many times the words M i . More precisely, the full message is read in a different order at each round: we have
The compression function uses an internal state of four words, and updates them one by one in 48 steps for MD4, and 64 steps for MD5. Here, we will assign a name to every different value of these registers, so the description is different from the standard one: the value changed on step i is called Q i (this follows the notations of Daum [5] ). The parameters for MD4 and MD5 are given in Table 1 .
The security of the compression function was based on the fact that the operations are not "compatible" and mix the properties of the input.
We will use x [k] to represent the k + 1-th bit of x, that is x [k] = (x ≫ k) mod 2 (note that we count bits and steps starting from 0).
Wang's Attack against MD4 and MD5
Wang et al. attacks against the hash functions of the MD4 family are differential attacks, and have the same structure with two main parts:
1. A precomputation phase:
• choose a message difference ∆
• find a differential path
• compute a set of sufficient conditions 2. Search for a message M that satisfies the conditions; then
The differential path specifies how the computations of H(M) and H(M +∆) are related: it tells how the differences introduced in the message will evolve in the internal state Q i . If we choose ∆ with a low hamming weight, and some extra properties, we can find some differences in the Q i 's that are very likely. Then we look at each step of the compression function, and we can express a set of sufficient conditions that will make the Q i 's follow the path. These conditions are on the bits of Q i , so we can not directly find a message satisfying them; however some of them can be fulfilled deterministically through message modifications, and the rest will be statistical by trial and error.
A New Approach to Collision Finding
In this paper we assume that we are given a set of sufficient conditions on the internal state variables Q i that produces collisions. We will try to find a message M such that when one computes a hash of this message, the conditions on the Q i 's hold. We will first describe the general idea that applies to both MD4 and MD5, and we will then study in more details those two hash functions.
In contrast to previous works [15, 12, 2], we will not focus on a particular path and give message modification techniques for every single condition, but we will give a generic algorithm that can take any path as input, like Klima in [11] and Stevens in [22] . Our method is based on two important facts:
1. We can search a suitable internal state rather than searching a suitable message, because the step update function is invertible: if Q i+1 , Q i+2 and Q i+3 are known, then we can compute any one of Q i , Q i+4 or m i from the two others (see Algorithm 1 for explicit formulas).
2. We do not need to search for the internal state from the beginning to the end. If we start from the middle we can satisfy the conditions in the first round and some conditions in the second round at the time; additionally we can choose the end of the message before running the search with little extra cost.
Algorithm 1
Step functions
function MD5STEPBACKWARD(i) 10 : 
MD5
Step update: 
Previous Works
Wang's method to find a message satisfying a set of conditions is roughly described in Algorithm 3 in Appendix B: one basically picks many messages at random, modifies them to fulfill some of the conditions, and checks if the other conditions are fulfilled.
The best message modifications known allow to satisfy every condition up to round 22 in MD4 (which gives a collision probability of 2 −2 ) and up to round 24 in MD5 (which gives a collision probability of 2 −29 ). Basically, message modifications for the conditions in the first round are very easy, but in the second round it becomes much more difficult because we cannot freely change message words without breaking the Q i in the first round (and therefore also in the second round). At the beginning of the second round it is still possible to find message modifications, but it becomes increasingly difficult as we go forward. Wang's differential paths are chosen with this constraint in mind, and most of their conditions are in the first round and at the beginning of the second.
The algorithm can be rewritten more efficiently: instead of choosing a random message and modify it, we can choose the Q i in the first round and compute the corresponding message. Since all the conditions in MD4 and MD5 are on the Q i 's, this will avoid the need for message modifications in the first round.
To further enhance this algorithm, Klima introduced the idea of tunnels in [12] , which is closely related to Biham and Chen's neutral bits used in the cryptanalysis of SHA-0 [1] . A tunnel is a message modification that does not affect the conditions up to some step p v − 1 (point of verification). Therefore, if we have one message that fulfill the conditions up to p v − 1 and τ tunnels, we can generate 2 τ messages that fulfills conditions up to step p v − 1. This does not change the number of messages we have to try, but it greatly reduces the cost of a single try, and therefore speeds up collision search a lot. This is described in Algorithm 4 in Appendix B.
In MD4 and MD5, the point of verification will be in the second round, and we put it after the last condition in the second round (step 22 in MD4, 24 in MD5). We have message modifications for almost every condition before the point of verification, and it seems impossible to find message modifications for round 3 and later.
Our Method
Our method is somewhat different: we will not fix the Q i from the beginning to the end, but we will start from the middle, and this will allow us to deal with the first round and the beginning of the second round at the same time.
First we choose a point of choice p c of and a point of verification p v . The point of verification is the step where we will start using tunnels, and the point of choice is the first step whose conditions will not be satisfied deterministically. The value of p c depends on the message expansion used in the second round: we must have π(16) < π(17) < ... < π(p c − 1) < 12, so we will choose p c = 19 in MD4 (π(18) = 8), and p c = 19 in MD5 (π (18) = 11) .
The key idea of our collision search is to first choose the end of the first round, i.e. Q 12 to Q 15 . Then we can follow the computations in the first round and in the second round at the same time, and choose m i 's that satisfy the conditions in both rounds. There is no difficulty when the first round meets the values we fixed in the beginning: since we only fixed the Q i 's, we just have to compute the corresponding m i 's. More precisely, we will choose the Q i from step 0 to π(p c − 1), and when we hit a message m i that is also used in the second round with i = π( j), we can modify it to generate a good Q j since we have already fixed Q j−4 , Q j−3 , Q j−2 and Q j−1 . Thus, we can fulfill conditions up to round p c − 1 almost for free. Figure 3 shows the order in which the internal words are chosen.
In the end, we will make random choices for the remaining steps (Q π(p c −1)+1 to Q 11 ), until we have a message that follows the path up to step p v − 1, and finally we use the tunnels. For a more detailed description of the algorithm, see Algorithm 2 in Appendix B, and take t = 0 (this algorithm is more generic and will be described in the next section). 
Figure 3: Collision search: the numbers show the order in which we choose the different words.
Since we do not choose the Q i 's in the natural order, we have to modify a little bit the set of sufficient conditions: if we have a condition Q
11 , we will instead use Q
12 because we choose Q 12 before Q 11 .
Compared to standard message modifications, our algorithm has an extra cost when we try to satisfy conditions in steps p c to p v − 1. However, this is not so important for two reasons:
• Testing one message only requires to compute a few steps, and we will typically have less than 10 conditions to satisfy, so this step will only cost about a hundred hash computations.
• This cost will be shared between all the messages which we find with the tunnels. In the case of MD5, we have to use a lot of tunnels to satisfy the 29 conditions in round 3 and 4 anyway, and in MD4 we will use a lot of tunnels if we look for many collisions (if one needs a single MD4 collision, the collision search cost should not be a problem).
Choosing a Part of the Message
This method can be extended to allow some message words to be fixed in the collision search. This will make the search for a first message following the path up to the point of verification harder, and it will forbid the use of some tunnels. Actually, we are buying some message freedom with computation time, but we can still find collisions very efficiently. We will show which message words can be chosen, and how to adapt the algorithm to find a first message following the path up to the step p v − 1 with some message words chosen.
Choosing the Beginning
If the first steps in the first round are such that in the second round m 0 ...m i are only used after the step p c or in a step j with no condition on Q j , then we can choose m 0 ...m i before running the algorithm. The choice of m 0 ...m i will only fix Q 0 ...Q i (if there are some conditions on Q 0 ...Q i , we must make sure they are satisfied by the message chosen), and the algorithm will work without needing any modification. On MD5, this allows to choose m 0 . Using Wang's path, there are no conditions on Q 0 for the first block, so m 0 is really free, but in the second block there are many conditions. On MD4, we have π(16) = 0, so this can only be used if we use p c = 16, which will significantly increase the cost of the collision search.
Choosing the End
The main advantage of our algorithm is that it allows to choose the end of the message. This is an unsuspected property of Wang's attack, and it will be the core of our attack against APOP. Our idea is to split the search in two: first deal with fixed message words, then choose the other internal state variables. This is made possible because our algorithm starts at the end of the first round; the conditions in those steps do not directly fix bits of the message, they also depend on the beginning of the message.
More precisely, if we are looking for collisions where the last t words are chosen, we begin by fixing Q 12−t , Q 13−t , Q 14−t and Q 15−t , and we compute Q 16−t to Q 15 using the chosen message words. We can modify Q 12−t if the conditions on the first state Q 16−t are not satisfied, but for the remaining t − 1 steps this is impossible because it would break the previous steps. So, these conditions will be fulfilled only statistically, and we might have to try many choices of Q 12−t , Q 13−t , Q 14−t , Q 15−t (note that each choice does not cost a full MD4 computation, but only a few steps).
Once we have a partial state that matches the chosen message, we run the same algorithm as in the previous section, but we will be able to deal with less steps of the second round due to the extra fixed states Q 12−t to Q 11 . This is illustrated by Figure 4 , and the full algorithm is given as Algorithm 2 in Appendix B.
MD4 Message Freedom
Using Wang's EUROCRYPT path [26].
If we use Wang's EUROCRYPT path, we will choose p v = 23 so as to use tunnels only for the third round. Therefore, the tunnels will have to preserve the values of m 0 , m 4 , m 8 , m 12 , m 1 , m 5 and m 9 when they modify the Q i 's in the first round.
There are two easy tunnels we can use, in Q 2 and Q 6 . If we change the value of Q 2 , we will have to recompute m 2 to m 6 as we do not want to change any other Q i , but if we look at step 4, we see that Q 2 is only used trough IF(Q 3 , Q 2 , Q 1 ). So some bits of Q 2 can be changed without changing 6 without altering m 8 and m 9 . If we add some extra conditions on the path we can enlarge these tunnels, but we believe it's not necessary for MD4.
We can use our collision finding algorithm with up to 5 fixed words; Table 2 gives the number of conditions we will have to satisfy probabilistically. Of course, the cost of the search increases with t, but with t = 3 it should be about one 2 9 MD4 computations, which is still very low. Note that this cost is only for the first collision; if one is looking for a bunch of collisions, this cost will be shared between all the collisions found through the tunnels, and we expect 2 14 of them. Another important remark is that this path has a non-zero difference in m 12 ; therefore when choosing more than 3 words, the chosen part in M and M will have a one bit difference. [31] .
Using Yu et al.'s CANS path
To push this technique to the limit, we will try to use t = 11: this leaves only m 0 to m 4 free, which is the minimum freedom to keep a tunnel. In this setting, the conditions in steps 6 to 15 can only be satisfied statistically, which will be very expensive with Wang's path [26] (its goal was to concentrate the conditions in the first round). Therefore we will use the path from [31] , which has only 17 conditions in steps 6 to 15.
Since we fix almost the full message, the second phase of the search where we satisfy conditions in the first and second round at the same time will be very limited, and we have p c = 17. Then we use the tunnel in Q 0 , which is equivalent to iterating over the possible Q 16 's, computing m 0 from Q 16 , and then recomputing Q 0 and m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , m 4 . There are 34 remaining conditions, so we will have to use the tunnel about 2 34 times. Roughly, we break the message search in two: first find m 0 ..m 4 such that the message follows steps 0 to 16, then modify it to follow up to the end by changing Q 0 . This path is well suited for this approach, with few conditions well spread over the first two rounds.
This gives us a lot of freedom in MD4 collisions, but the collision search becomes more expensive. Another interesting property of this path is that it only introduces a difference in m 4 , so the 11 chosen words will be the same in M and M .
MD5 Message Freedom
Using Wang's MD5 path [28] , we will choose p v = 24 so as to use tunnels only for the third round. Therefore, when we modify the Q i 's in the first round to use the tunnels, we have to keep the values of m 1 , m 6 , m 11 , m 0 , m 5 , m 10 , m 15 and m 4 . We will not describe the available tunnels here, since they are extensively described in Klima's paper [12] .
We use the set of conditions from Stevens [22] , which adds the conditions on the rotations that were missing in Wang's paper [28] . We had to remove the condition because it is incompatible with some choices of m 15 , so we check instead the less restrictive condition on Φ 15 (Φ [31] 15 = 0). We also found out that some conditions mark as optimization conditions were actually needed for the set of conditions to be sufficient.
As already stated, we can choose m 0 in the first block, and we will see how many words we can choose in the end of the message. With t = 0, we set p c = 19, so we have 7 conditions in steps p c to p v − 1, and after p v , there are 29 conditions for the first block, and 22 for the second block. With t = 1, we use p c = 18, which increase the number of conditions between steps p c and p v − 1 to 9, but since we will use a lot of tunnels, this has very little impact on the computing time. We can also try to set t = 2, but this adds a lot of conditions when we search the states in the end of the first round. According to our experiments, the conditions on the Q i 's also imply some conditions on m 14 , so m 14 could not be chosen freely anyway.
As a summary, in a two-block MD5 collision (M||N, M ||N ), we can choose M 0 , M 15 and N 15 , and the complexity of the collision search is roughly the same as a collision search without extra constraints.
We only implemented a little number of tunnels, but we find the first block in a few minutes with m 0 and m 15 chosen, and the second block in a few seconds with m 15 chosen. This is close to Klima's results in [12] .
Applications
Freedom in colliding blocks can be used to break some protocols and to create collisions of special shape. The applications we show here requires that the chosen part is identical in M and M , i.e. the differential path must not use a difference there. 
Fixing the Padding
We can use this technique to find messages with the padding included in the colliding block. For instance, this can be useful to build pseudo-collision of the hash function: if there is a padding block after the pseudo-colliding messages, the pseudo-collision will be completely broken.
We can also find collisions on messages shorter than one block, if we fix the rest of the block to the correct padding. An example of a 160 bit MD4 collision is given in Table ? ? in Appendix ??.
Zeroed Collisions
Szydlo and Yin proposed some message preprocessing techniques to avoid collisions attacks against MD5 and SHA-1 in [24] . Their idea is to impose some restrictions on the message, so that collision attacks become harder. One of their schemes is called message whitening: the message is broken into blocks smaller than 16 words, and the last t words are filled with zeroes. Using our technique we can break this strengthening for MD4 and MD5: in Appendix ?? we show a 11-whitened MD4 collision in Table ? ? and a 1-whitened MD5 collision in Table ? ?.
The APOP Attack in Practice
To implement this attack, we need to efficiently generate MD5 collisions with some chosen parts; we mainly have to fix the last word, which is precisely what we can do cheaply on MD5.
Additionally, the POP3 RFC [14] requires the challenge to be a msg-id, which means that:
• It has to begin with '<' and end with '>'
• It must contain exactly one '@', and the remaining characters are very restricted, in particular, they should be ASCII characters. Since we can not find two colliding ASCII messages with Wang's path, this means that the attack will use non-RFC-compliant challenges.
In practice most mail clients do not check these requirements, leaving us a lot of freedom. According to our experiments with various mail software there are only four characters which they reject in the challenge:
• 0x00 Null: used as end-of-string in the C language
• 0x3e Greater-Than Sign ('>'): used to mark the end of the msg-id
• 0x0a Line-Feed: used for end-of-line (POP is a textbased protocol)
• 0x0d Carriage-Return: also used for end-of-line
Additionally, some mail clients needs at least one '@' in the msg-id, and Qualcomm Eudora truncates the challenge to 256 bytes, but we use less than 128 bytes long challenges anyway. We will use Wang's path [28] , which gives two-block collisions. The first block is more expensive to find, so we will use the same for every msg-id, and we will fix the first character as a '<', and the last character as a '@'. Then we have to generate a second block for every password character test; each time the last word is chosen, and we must avoid 4 characters in the message. Using the ideas from Section 3.5 we can do this in less than 5 seconds per collision on a standard desktop computer.
Unfortunately, this path uses a difference δ M 14 = 2 32 and this makes a difference in character 60. In order to learn the i-th password character p i−1 , we need to generate a collision where we fix the last i + 1 characters (i password characters, plus a '>' to form a correct msg-id). Therefore, we will only be able to retrieve 3 characters of the password with Wang's path. This points out a need for new paths following Wang's ideas, but adapted to other specific attacks; here a path less efficient for collision finding but with better placed differences could be used to learn more characters of the password.
Attack Complexity
To estimate the complexity of this attack, we will assume the user's password is 8-characters long, and each character has 6 bits of entropy. This seems to be the kind of password most people use (when they don't use a dictionary word...). Under these assumptions, we will have to generate 3 × 2 5 collisions, and wait for about 3 × 2 6 identifications. Each collision takes about 5 seconds to generate; if we assume that the client identifies once per minute this will be the limiting factor, and our attack will take about 3 hours. In a second phase we can do an offline exhaustive search over the missing password characters. We expect to find them after 2 30 MD5 computations and this will take about half an hour according to typical OpenSSL benchmarks. [20] . More importantly, Sasaki announced at the rump session of FSE '07 [19] that he had improved the attack; he can recover 31 password characters using a new differential path. He found a way to generate a pair of messages such that the chaining values have a difference on the most significant bit, and then use the path from den Boer and Bosselaers [7] . The details for the generation of the two messages are still unknown.
Following the same idea, we could use the birthday paradox to generate those two message: it requires the precomputation of about 2 64 MD5, but it will allow an attack with RFCcompliant messages.
Practical Security Impact
Since APOP is not designed to be secure in there is a man-inthe-middle, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of our attack: a man-in-the-middle can easily access the mails of his victim. With our attack, he will learn the password, and the consequences depend on the specific situation:
• if the attacker can only act as a man-in-the-middle for a limited time (eg. for a lunchtime attack, or using an open WiFi network) the password can be used to authenticate later on the mail server;
• if the same password is used for another resource (eg. a computer account), the attacker will gain access to this resource.
The practical impact depends highly on the number of APOP users, but it is quite hard to find statistics on email usage. The figures given here come from the computing services of some universities [25, 16] and from one ISP [18] (see Table 3 ); this not a big sample but it gives an estimate of email usage.
APOP users. There are three main method of accessing remote mail: POP3, IMAP and through a webmail. Depending on local policies one or more of these method are available, and one may be recommended (most of the time IMAP is recommended because it offers more advanced features). According to our data, more than 10% of the users are using POP3.
As, we explained in section 2.1, POP3 can be used with many authentication modes, providing different security levels:
• plain-text password;
• secure authentication (APOP or AUTH);
• full encryption of the session with SSL.
It should be noted that some servers do not support secure authentication methods, because they usually require to store the plain-text password (in this situation, users should use SSL encryption).
Some servers forbid plain-text password, but when it is allowed we are surprised to find that it is the most used method! APOP seems to be a quite popular secure authentication method: it is supported by most clients [30] and in the case of Table 3 , it is used by 3.5% of users. Overall, we believe that APOP is used by a non-negligible minority of email users (maybe in the order of magnitude of 1%).
Additionally, some mail user agents (eg. Mozilla Thunderbird) select the authentication method interactively, according to what the server supports, only avoiding plain-text login. In this situation, an attacker can claim to support only APOP, and he will be able to recover the password even if the usual authentication method was stronger.
We also did a quick experiment by sniffing WiFi traffic during a cryptographic conference. In 10 minutes, we saw 4 email users: two were sending plain-text password, one was authenticating with APOP, and one was using IMAP/SSL. This confirms the previous result: APOP is actually used in practice.
Mail software. Since the current attack needs non-RFCcompliant challenges, it could fail with some mail client. Therefore, we looked at the most popular mail client to see how they behave. The result are available in Table 4 : only Kmail rejects non-compliant challenges. We warned the author of these software, and most of them will add a check in the next release.
Currently, almost all APOP users are vulnerable to the attack.
Conclusion
The main contribution of our paper is an attack against the APOP authentication protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first practical attack against a real-word protocol based on hash function collisions. It shows that collisions can be a real threat, and the security of constructions based on MD4, MD5 or SHA-1 should be evaluated with regard to collision attacks.
We have also shown that Wang's attack allows some message freedom for MD4 and MD5 collisions, and how to exploit some of this freedom with little computational cost by tweaking the collision search algorithm. We believe that this freedom was widely underestimated and we built some examples to exploit it.
Recommendations
We believe APOP is to be considered broken, and we suggest users to switch to an other authentication protocol if possible. Since the current attack needs non-RFC-compliant challenges, an easy countermeasure in the mail user agent is to strictly check if the challenge follows the RFC, but this could be defeated by an improved attack.
tion in the first round. An example of such message is given in Table 5 , it has 18 bit differences from the target (a block consisting only of 1's), which is much better than achieved by Yu et al. (43 bit differences). Message M ff ff ff ff bf ff ff ff ff f7 ff ff ff ff df ff ff ff ff fd ff ff df ff ff ff fd ff ff ef ff ff ff ff ff ef ff ff ff fe ff ff ef 7f ff 7f ff ff 7f ff fd 7f ff bf ff ff ff ff ff ff ff bf ff fd Message M ff ff ff ff bf ff ff ff ff f7 ff ff ff ff df ff ff ff ff ff ff ff df ff ff ff fd ff ff ef ff ff ff ff ff ef ff ff ff fe ff ff ef 7f ff 7f ff ff 7f ff fd 7f ff bf ff ff ff ff ff ff ff bf ff fd MD4 without padding ff a3 b5 2d 51 63 59 36 11 e5 9a d0 a6 cf 8b 33 MD4 with padding 59 93 19 84 d0 6f 55 9f f3 d0 87 4b c6 24 f4 8d
B Algorithms
All the algorithms take the set of condition as an implicit input, and will modify a shared state containing the m i 's and the Q i 's.
